
Bitcoin’s preparations for future quantum-computing attacks have raised a difficult question for developers and custodians: how to move millions of coins into safer wallets while upgrading the institutions and bridges responsible for transferring them.
Summary
- Bitcoin’s quantum security challenge involves 7.12 million BTC behind exposed public keys.
- Glassnode estimates that 35.4% of Bitcoin’s issued supply has visible public keys on-chain.
- Bitcoin developers are debating BIP 360 and BIP 361 to address future quantum security risks.
- Custodians face additional challenges because quantum-resistant multi-party signing is still developing.
- BitGo tested post-quantum MPC security, while Rootstock outlined plans to upgrade its bridge.
Cysic CEO Leo Fan warned that replacing Bitcoin’s existing cryptography would not be enough unless holders, exchanges and other infrastructure providers could complete the transition. “The clock that matters is migration,” he said, arguing that practical changes across the network could take longer than developing new security standards.
Bitcoin quantum risk covers more than 7 million coins
According to Glassnode’s November 10 public-key analysis, approximately 7.12 million BTC, representing 35.4% of issued supply, was held behind public keys already visible on the blockchain. An earlier October estimate counted more than 6 million BTC, or 31.2% of circulating coins.
Exposed public keys are not compromised private keys. No publicly demonstrated quantum computer can currently break the elliptic-curve signatures used to authorize Bitcoin transactions. However, a sufficiently powerful future machine could theoretically derive private keys from visible public keys and gain unauthorized control of the associated funds.
Glassnode attributed 25.8% of Bitcoin’s supply exposure to address reuse, including 11.6% held on exchanges. The exchange holdings form part of the address-reuse category, while other exposed coins are held in older address formats and transaction structures that reveal public keys by design.
As crypto.news previously reported, Ledger technology chief Charles Guillemet expects Bitcoin’s transition to quantum-resistant security to take years because wallets, hardware devices and transaction systems must adopt compatible protections.
The situation becomes more complicated for dormant wallets whose owners have lost their private keys or cannot be contacted. Glassnode’s figures do not establish how many exposed coins are permanently inaccessible or how many holders could complete a future migration.
Bitcoin developers disagree over restrictions on older wallets
Bitcoin developers have been considering changes to address those vulnerabilities, although there is no agreement on whether holders should eventually be required to move their coins.
In April, Jameson Lopp and five other developers introduced Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 361, outlining a phased retirement of the ECDSA and Schnorr signatures currently used to authorize transactions.
The proposal would initially restrict payments to addresses using vulnerable signatures before introducing additional requirements for spending coins that had not migrated. Its proposed timeline would span several years after the activation of a compatible post-quantum transaction system.
Lopp has argued that restricting access to dormant holdings could be preferable to allowing future attackers to steal them. Blockstream CEO Adam Back has supported voluntary upgrades, opposing a predetermined deadline that could prevent legitimate owners from accessing their funds.
Neither position has become Bitcoin policy. A separate draft, BIP 360, proposes a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output type that removes Taproot’s key-path spending option.
The design could reduce attacks involving public keys exposed for long periods, but it does not independently introduce quantum-resistant signatures or eliminate every possible attack.
Fan emphasized the difficulty of upgrading wallets whose owners never return.
“Coins that never move are a social problem, not a technical one,” he said.
Custodians face challenges with quantum-resistant signatures
Institutional custody introduces another complication because exchanges and asset managers frequently distribute transaction approvals among several people or machines. Their security systems rely on multiple signatures or multi-party computation, which prevents one participant from independently controlling the funds.
Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized post-quantum signature standards in 2024, multi-party implementations remain under development.
In January 2026, NIST issued a separate call for proposals involving threshold cryptography, where several participants jointly perform cryptographic operations while keeping control of the private key distributed.
Some companies have begun testing possible solutions. In May, BitGo and Silence Laboratories completed a simulated post-quantum transaction using the ML-DSA signature standard within a multi-party computation system.
The demonstration showed how quantum-resistant signing could operate alongside institutional custody procedures, including distributed key management and transaction approvals. However, the companies have not announced a production deployment.
Coinbase has similarly called for a gradual transition. Its October recommendations identified signature sizes, transaction fees, network capacity and wallet compatibility as factors developers must consider before introducing new Bitcoin security standards.
Bitcoin bridges face additional security upgrades
Cross-chain bridges face further challenges because their security arrangements involve multiple networks. Rootstock’s PowPeg, for example, locks Bitcoin on its original blockchain and supports corresponding RBTC assets on the Rootstock sidechain.
Under Rootstock’s published roadmap, protocol-level post-quantum signatures and hybrid accounts are planned for 2027, followed by an assisted account migration program in 2028.
Its bridge-related work includes upgrading specialized signing infrastructure, developing hardware security module protections and preparing changes to how Bitcoin assets move between networks. Rootstock cannot independently introduce quantum-resistant signatures into Bitcoin’s underlying protocol.
Other blockchains have begun adopting protections for individual accounts. NEAR introduced ML-DSA transaction signing through its July mainnet upgrade, while Algorand launched native Falcon-1024 accounts in August.
Algorand’s implementation allows users to create quantum-resistant accounts, although work on broader institutional multisignature support and additional wallet integrations remains under development.





